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THE ADVERSITY OF RACE AND PLACE:
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE IN
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000)
Adam B. Wolf*
American colonial courts authorized constables and citizens to detain
all African Americans found on public streets.' Likewise, the South Caro-
lina legislature mandated in the Seventeenth Century that state slave
patrols search slave quarters every week.2 Poor people of color were sub-
jected to race-based and location-based searches and seizures well before3
the Bill of Rights was enacted. The Fourth Amendment-responding to
such practices-was designed to protect against "arbitrary intrusions by
the police" and thereby to promote a "free society.",4 Yet, the Supreme
Court recently found it acceptable, in Illinois v. Wardlow,s for law en-
forcement officials to effectuate race-based and location-based intrusions.
In Wardlow, the Court insisted that it was merely adhering to prece-
dent.6 This is mostly true-the Court looked to the totality of the
circumstances in assessing the constitutionality of a Terry stop,7 devised
* Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 6. This Case Note is
dedicated to my South African comrades, who showed me that to not resist is to acqui-
esce in our own oppression.
1. See Tracey Machn, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 334
(1998).
2. See id. at 334-35.
3. The Fourth Amendment ensures that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." U.S.
CON ST. amend. IV. It is "given force and effect by the exclusionary rule." Wayne R.
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Di-
lemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974).
4. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.).
5. 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
6. See id. at 675-77.
7. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry court held that it is not uncon-
stitutional for the police to search a suspect when officers lack probable cause to arrest
him. See id. at 30. In the absence of probable cause for an arrest, the police may search a
suspect if they "reasonably conclude in light of [their experience] . . . that criminal activ-
ity may be afoot." Id.
The current standard is that officers may detain someone and conduct a brief in-
vestigatory search if they have "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity, which is
"considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence."
United States v. Sokolow, 490,U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The suspicion must amount to more
than a mere "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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rules based on race and socioeconomic class, and relied on an ivory-tower
analysis that refused to recognize patterns and practices of police brutality,
which dismissed the legitimate fears of poor people of color as unreason-
able and irrelevant.8
Rather, an officer must be able to point to some "objective evidentiary justification." Id.
at 15. The police officer must act on "specific articulable facts, which, taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts," id. at 21, provide a "particularized suspi-
cion" for assuming the detainee has, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity,
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
A reviewing court looks to the "totality of the circumstances," Sokolow, 490 U.S.
at 8, whose factors have gradually expanded. See e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 232 (1985) (tips from law enforcement agencies); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1050 (1983) (apparent intoxication); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)
(traffic violations); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (tips from civilian
informants); United States v. Simmons, 918 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1990) (observed
nervousness of the suspect). A court also considers the suspect's presence in a high-crime
area and attempts to evade law enforcement officers. See infra text accompanying note 26.
For a discussion of these and other factors, see JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., 1 SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 15.10-15.17 (3d ed. 2000); WILLIAM E. RINGEL, 2 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 13.4 (1979); Steven C. Bell, Factors Which Justify a Stop and
Frisk, 6 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 1 (June 1979).
8. A more conciliatory reading of recent Fourth Amendment Supreme Court
opinions is that the Court refuses to account for race, even if brought to the Court's at-
tention by defense attorneys and arnicus curiae. For example, when the Terry court was
considering whether to allow stop and frisk searches when officers possessed less than
probable cause, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (NAACP LDF) urged
the Court, in its amicus brief, to consider studies detailing African Americans' understand-
able distrust of the police. See Brief for the NAACP LDF as Amicus Curiae 58-69, noted in
Tracey Macin, "Black and Blue Encounters," Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. R.Ev. 243, 267 (1991-92). While
the Court recognized the NAACP LDF's argument, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 14, it "was
given subordinate status to the Court's main concern with police officer safety." Maclin,
supra, at 267.
The same could be said of the Supreme Court's opinions in Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); and Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Bostick, the Court upheld police drug interdiction raids on inter-
state buses that disparately impacted people of color, see Brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 18 n.19, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("the
defendants all appear to be Black or Hispanic"), without discussing race. See Robert V.
Ward, Consenting to Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
"Reasonable Person", 36 How. LJ. 239, 253 (1993) (noting no mention of Mr. Bostick's
race at oral argument).
The Garner Court likewise intentionally neglected that the issue at bar--the con-
stitutionality of police officers using deadly force to seize unarmed, fleeing felons-
disproportionately affected people of color. See Respondent's Brief at 23-26, Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (alerting the Court to this impact on African Americans).
Similarly, the Court ruled four years ago in Whren that no violation of the Fourth
Amendment occurred when officers' traffic violation stops were pretextual, which
"neglect[ed] racial concerns" clearly discernable to all involved. Machn, supra note 1, at
340.
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This Case Note lays out Wardlow's pertinent facts, describes the de-
cisions of the Court and lower courts, and then analyzes the ramifications
of the Court's holding. In particular, this Case Note argues that the
Court's ruling recognizes substantially less Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for people of color and indigent citizens than for wealthy
Caucasians. This perpetuates a cycle of humiliating experiences, 9 as well
as fear and mistrust of the police by many poor people of color.
I
Wardlow's facts were not disputed. At approximately noon' ° on Sep-
tember 9, 1995, eight officers (in four marked police vehicles) were
driving through an area known for drug trafficking." William Wardlow,
9. Although the Wardlow majority attempted to belittle the effect of a Terry stop,
referring to it as merely a "brief, investigatory stop," Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673,
675 (2000), the stop is embarassing and intrusive, regardless of its length. See id. at 678
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "[e]ven a limited search ... must be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1968)).
Anyone contesting the humiliation and severe intrusion accompanying a Terry
stop should consider "The Routine," LAPD's standard Terry stop: an officer forces the
detainee to kneel on the ground where he is stopped, and then to interlock his fingers
behind his neck. The officer then demands that the suspect lie "prone out" (i.e., with his
face touching the ground). David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry,
28 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 1, 3-4 (1994).
10. See People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). The Supreme
Court did not even mention-let alone consider as relevant--the time of Wardlow's
arrest. However, suspicion may be heightened if the suspect is observed in the middle of
the night, and consequently, there is less cause for suspicion if the suspect is observed, as
here, during daylight hours. Compare United States v. Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540, 542
(9th Cir. 1975) (concluding that less suspicion attaches if the defendant's observed con-
duct transpired during daylight hours), State v. Stampalia, No. 38402-3-1, 1997 WL
360790, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (same), and Gibbs v. State, 306 A.2d 587, 593 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (same), with United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429 (8th Cir.
1995) (finding Terry was satisfied because, in part, the suspect was outside at a late hour),
United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1994) (same), United States v.
Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), and Commonwealth v. Cortez,
491 A.2d 111, 112 (Pa. 1985) (same). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 454 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining that the
time of day a suspect is observed is an appropriate factor in assessing whether reasonable
suspicion existed to warrant a Terry stop); Brian J. O'Connell, Casenote, Search and Sei-
zure: The Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Under the Terry Standard, Creating Suspicion in
High Crime Areas, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 730-31 (1991) (observing that "[m]ost of
the cases where the time of day has been found to contribute to reasonable suspicion
involve suspects who are observed on the streets near midnight, and typically much
later").
11. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 674.
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a forty-four-year-old African American man, standing alone and not en-
gaging in any suspicious activity, fled the area as the caravan passed.12 The
two officers in the last car gave chase, though they observed nothing out
of the ordinary about Wardlow except his flight.' 3 The officers stopped
him and immediately conducted a pat-down search.' 4 During the frisk,
one of the officers felt an object in a closed bag Wardlow was carrying.' s
The officer opened the bag, found a handgun and ammunition, and ar-
rested Wardlow, charging him with the unlawful possession of a handgun
by a felon.
16
At trial, the Cook County Court denied Wardlow's motion to sup-
press the contraband's seizure pursuant to an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation. 17 It convicted Wardlow after a stipulated bench trial and sen-
tenced him to two years imprisonment.' The appellate court reversed the
conviction, holding that Wardlow's sudden flight did not justify a Terry
stop.19
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the state court of appeals'
decision. 20 It found that observing a subject who flees at the sight of po-
lice officers in a high-crime area, without more, does not meet the Terry
standard: a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts
that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. 2' The of-
ficers, the Illinois Supreme Court found, impermissibly acted on a mere
subjective "hunch" that Wardlow was engaging in criminal activity, and
it further held that his flight was merely his exercising his constitutional
right "to move on.
'22
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Wardlow's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.2 A five-member majority,
with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court, recognized that the
12. See id. at 675.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 484 (Ill. 1998).
18. See id.
19. See People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (11. App. Ct.) (1997). The court did
not consider the fact that Wardlow was seized in a "high-crime area" because it found
that a high-crime area must be "sufficiently localized and identifiable" and that the record
was "simply too vague to support the inference that the defendant was in a location with
a high incidence of narcotics trafficking." Id. at 67.
20. See People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 486.
21. See id. at 488-89 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
22. Id. at 487 (referencing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
23. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
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Court's prior cases held that presence in a high-crime area does not by
itself justify a Terry stop, 24 and that refusal to cooperate with police,
without more, is likewise insufficient," but that both factors are relevant
when assessing the reasonable suspicion necessary for an officer to con-
duct a stop.2 6 It then concluded that these two conditions combined are
sufficient to provide officers a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.
2 7
II
The Wardlow majority's holding-that flight from the police in a
high-crime area satisfies Terry---disproportionately affects people of color
and people with a low socioeconomic status. However, the Fourth
Amendment makes no distinction between the protections extended to
different groups of people.2 It does not refer to the right of rich people to be
secure in their persons or the right of White people to be secure in their persons.
The Supreme Court, however, in Wardlow, through short-sighted rea-
soning and unjust application, interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
include such race- and class-based distinctions. Indeed, the decision fur-
thers American aristocracy and pigmentocracy.
29A. Race Matters
The Court's reliance on flight is rooted in its belief that "[t]he
wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a
lion. ' '30 It agreed with the arresting officers' conclusion that Wardlow was
24. See id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 47 (1979)).
25. See id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
26. See id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (presence in a
high-crime area is an appropriate consideration in Terry analysis); United States v. Sok-
olow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (evasive behavior similarly pertinent); Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 885 (1975) (same)). See generally LAFAvE, supra note 10, at 448 (explaining that flight
"may be taken into account by the police and that together with other suspicious cir-
cumstances these reactions may justify a stopping for investigation").
27. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 675 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
28. "Every person has a right not to be targeted without justification. The Fourth
Amendment... [secures] the right of all people to be treated fairly .... " Sherry F. Colb,
Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
1456, 1525 (1996) (emphasis added).
29. 1 borrow this phrase from Cornell West's insightful book, RACE MATTERs (1993).
30. Proverbs 28:1. Justice Stevens, whose opinion concurred in part and dissented in
part, and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, countered that there are
many reasons an "innocent" person would flee from the police, including an unwilling-
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involved in criminal activity because he fled.31 Such analysis ignores scores
of studies and detailed testimony regarding the legitimate fear of the po-
lice held by some people of color, and thus their reasonable flight at the
sight of law enforcement officers.32
The fact that many people of color in the United States generally
feel "alienation and hostility" toward the police is undeniable.33 Police
brutality and harassment are common topics of conversation in commu-
nities of color.3 Accounts of such experiences are traded like war stories;
there are few people of color, contends Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
"who don't have more than one story to tell., 3' These shared common
experiences are exchanged between friends and family members and
through community newsletters and radio programs. At some point,
many people of color begin to view the police as just another gang, a
vigilante organization whose raison d'tre is to seek and destroy people of
ness to appear as a witness at a future trial and a fear of having his or her name connected
to a criminal trial. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896)). It pointed to
one more possible cause: people of color, based on their prior experiences, are generally
afraid of the police. See id.
31. See Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676. The Court admitted that "there are innocent
reasons for flight from police," but refused to enumerate these reasons or give them much
weight. Id.
32. Even federal courts and prosecutors publicly recognize such alienation. See
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing prosecutor's at-
tempt to use a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror from Compton because the
government understood that the juror believed that the "police in Compton ... pick on
black people").
33. Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young + Black +
Male = Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621, 629 (1993). See also DAVID COLE, No
EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23, 24, 26
(1999) (documenting distrust of people of color of the police in Los Angeles, New York,
and Boston, respectively).
34. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). Because
police officers use race as a proxy for an increased risk of criminality, Professor
Kennedy reports, people of color "tend to grow up believing that the law is the enemy."
Id. at 76.
35. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 23, 1995, at 58. Professor Kennedy reiterates: "A dangerous, humiliating, sometimes
fatal encounter with the police is almost a rite of passage for a black man in the United
States." KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 152-53 (quoting Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power,
N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987). Kennedy and Gates eerily restate James Baldwin's haunting
observation 40 years earlier: "[r]are, indeed, is the Harlem citizen, from the most cir-
cumspect church member to the most shiftless adolescent, who does not have a long tale
to tell of police incompetence, injustice, or brutality." JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS
My NAME: MORE NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 66 (1961) (quoted in Brief for the NAACP
LDF as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 S. Ct.
673 (2000)).
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color.-1 A few examples-clearly just a sampling of hundreds of thousands
of such instances-will hopefully provide a proper backdrop to show the
reasonableness of the fear of the police felt by many people of color, and,
therefore, their ffight response.
Perhaps the most well-known and vivid alleged racial attack by po-
lice officers on an unarmed civilian is the infamous Rodney King beating.
King was pulled over in his vehicle by the police, and without demon-
strating much resistance, was forced out of his car. Inexplicably, King was
beaten with police batons, kicked, stomped, and shot twice with a stun
gun while more than a dozen officers observed the assault.37 He lay on the
ground with his hands covering his head for much of the abuse. As a re-
sult of the fifty-six blows King received, he sustained brain damage, skull
fractures, partial paralysis of the face, a shattered eye socket, internal
bleeding, missing teeth, and a broken leg and ankle. 8
Adolph Lyons, also an African American, shares a similar story. He
was pulled over by four LAPD officers for driving with a burned-out
36. See Maclin, supra note 1, at 388. A typical view is expressed by a Chicano resi-
dent of a Los Angeles, California housing project:
Sometimes I think of the Los Angeles police officers in the neighborhood
as soldiers of a hostile foreign army who harass good citizens and commit
untold acts of brutality. We are not against the police. We think it's right
that they come and do their work and take away those people doing
bad.... But we don't want them to beat our children and call us dirty
names.
Ward, supra note 8, at 247 (quoting Hector Tobar, Police Fear, Need Shape Pico-Aliso, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1991, at BI).
37. See Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue:
Details Heighten Sense That It Was No Aberration, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al. The
beating lasted for nearly two minutes, and it was carried out in fill view of the street and
with residents shouting, "[nlo, don't kill him," leading many critics to conclude that the
officers thought that they could act "ferociously" with impunity. Id. at 137. See also Seth
Mydans, In Messages, Officers Banter After Beating in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1991, at Al (describing how the officers engaged in "lighthearted banter" immediately
following the episode).
38. See CORAMAE IRJCHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 134 (1993). Los Angeles Police
Chief Daryl Gates referred to the beating as an "aberration," even though the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) doled out $8.1 million to victims of excessive force the pre-
vious year and received in excess of 600 complaints alleging police brutality by LAPD
officers that year. See id. (citing Bill Torque, Linda Beckley & Linda Wright, Brutality on
the Beat, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 32-34). In addition, the ACLU of Southern
California police brutality hotline received an average of 55 complaints per week from
African American and Hispanic American citizens the same year. See id. (citing James N.
Baker & Linda Wright, Los Angeles After Shocks, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 1991, at 18-19).
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taillight. 39 They approached the car with guns drawn and ordered
Lyons-who was not acting suspiciously--out of the car. 40 He complied,
as he did when the officers asked him to face his car, spread his legs, and
put his hands on his head.4' Lyons dropped his hands after the ensuing
pat-down search, which prompted an officer to slam his hands to the
back of his head. When Lyons complained of pain from holding his
keys, the officer applied a chokehold with such force that Lyons lost
consciousness and fell to the ground.43 When he regained consciousness,
Lyons had spat up blood, urinated and defecated, and suffered permanent
damage to his larynx. The officers then left after issuing Lyons a traffic
ticket for the taillight infraction."
Such stories are not limited to the west coast.45 In Detroit, Malice
Green, an African American, was kicked, punched, and beaten by police
39. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983) (concluding that Lyons had
failed to demonstrate a case or controversy sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunc-
tion prohibiting LAPD officers from ever again using a chokehold).
40. See COLE, supra note 33, at 161.
41. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 114-15.
43. See COLE, supra note 33, at 162.
44. See id.
The chokehold was applied 975 times by LAPD officers between 1975 and 1980,
killing 16 people, 12 of whom were African American. See id. In a city in which African
American males comprise nine percent of the population, they have been the victims of
75% of LAPD chokehold deaths. See Macin, supra note 8, at 256 n.56. Former LAPD
Chief of Police Daryl Gates blamed the victims--and African Americans in general-for
the deaths, claiming that African Americans do "not hav[e] veins in their necks like
,normal people."' MANN, supra note 38, at 152 (citing Torque, Buckley & Wright, supra
note 38, at 33).
45. California, and Los Angeles, in particular, seems to be a hot-bed of race-based
police brutality. The LAPD has come under even more intense scrutiny recently as a
result of the much-publicized Rampart Division scandal. Substantiated allegations of po-
lice officers assaulting unarmed citizens, filing false arrest reports, and stealing evidence
have surfaced after one member of the Division's anti-gang unit admitted that his partner
and he had handcuffed and shot an unarmed man, then framed him by placing a gun near
his paralyzed body. See Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles Police Scandal May Soil Hundreds of
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at A16. The officer told investigators about the assault
and agreed to cooperate in discussing other officers' similar rogue behavior after he was
convicted of stealing cocaine that was being held as evidence. See id. Such unauthorized
violence, lying, and thievery is being exposed as "the Rampart way." Matt Lait & Jim
Newton, The 'Rampart Way': Macho, Insubordinate, and Cliquish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2000, at A16.
Consider also the story of Don Jackson, a former police officer who visited Long
Beach, California to witness police harassment and brutality inflicted upon people of
color. On their way to Long Beach, he and a companion received a first-hand account.
They were stopped by the police while driving and asked to get out of the car. Jackson
did, and when he asked why he was stopped, an officer threw him through a plate-glass
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officers with a heavy flashlight. He died after receiving fourteen rapid-fire
blows to his head. The official reason for the assault was that the officers
were bothered that Green would not "expose his palm."
In Miami, police officers reported that a thirty-three-year-old
African American insurance salesman, Arthur McDuffie, died when he
fell off his motorcycle. 7 Not long after, the officers' prevarications were
revealed, and it was shown that McDuffie was killed when the officers
repeatedly hit him.4 His broken motorcycle evidenced only that the offi-
cers tried to cover up the murder by running over it with their squad
car.49 The fatal injuries, the medical examiner explained, were as bad as
those suffered when one falls from the top of a four-story building and
lands on concrete-head first.50
Six years ago a special investigation by the Mollen Commission was
established in New York City to uncover rampant police corruption and
brutality. The final report was bleak, though expected: such brutality was
widespread and was uniformly directed toward people of color. One offi-
cer bragged that he was known as "The Mechanic" because "I used to
tune people up.""1 When asked why he savagely assaulted people, but
rarely, if ever, arrested the suspects, The Mechanic replied: "[t]o show
who was in charge. We were in charge, the police.,5 2 The Commission
found that The Mechanic's victims, like most of the police brutality vic-
tims in New York, were people of color. 3
store window. See Machn, supra note 8, at 254. Jackson subsequently wrote in a New
York Times op-ed article that "the police have long been the greatest nemesis of blacks,
irrespective of whether we are complying with the law or not." Don Jackson, Police Em-
body Racism to My People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at A25.
46. Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amend-
ment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L.
Rav. 151, 156 (1994). Officer Larry Nevers was subsequently convicted on charges of
second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter for killing Green. See Ex-Detroit
Officer Guilty in Beating Death, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2000, at A9.
47. See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 116.
48. Seeid. at 117.
49. See id.
50. See id. The four rogue officers were prosecuted for second-degree murder. They
successfully petitioned for their trial to be moved to Tampa, where earlier that year an all-
White jury acquitted other police officers of charges stemming from their killing a young
Black motorcyclist stopped for a routine traffic violation. After striking all potential Black
jurors, the defendant officers were acquitted by an all-White jury. The acquittal led to
rioting in socioeconomically depressed areas of Miami. See id.
51. CoLE, supra note 33, at 23.
52. Ex-Offcer's Account of Brutal Police Fraternity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at B3.
53. See COLE, supra note 33, at 23. Police officers' recent use of violence in New
York City casts doubt on the hope that the NYPD has changed its ways since the Mollen
Commission's findings. Between February 1999 and March 2000, for instance, plain-
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Police brutality is not limited to socioeconomically disadvantaged
people of color. The only egalitarian police practice, one could conclude,
is that nearly all people of color are victims of police abuse.14 Al Joyner,
an Olympic bronze medalist, refuses to drive in Los Angeles due to a fear
of being further harassed by the police.5 Hall of Fame baseball player Joe
Morgan, former professional football star Marcus Allen, and retired bas-
ketball standout Jamaal Wilkes have similarly been unreasonably detained
and harassed by the police due, at least in part, to the color of their skin. 6
The aforementioned stories are graphic, sensational, and deeply
troubling. They represent more than physical injuries-they are manifes-
tations of police, societal, and governmental racial discrimination that
permeate the country.
One obvious result is that many people of color learn to fear the po-
lice. It is apparent that Americans of color are likely to be stopped by law
enforcement officers, 7 suffer tremendous embarrassment from such stops,
clothes officers have killed three unarmed men. See William K. Rashbaum, Unarmed Man
is Shot to Death in Scuffle With 3 Undercover Detectives, N.Y. TussEs, Mar. 17, 2000, at A19.
Most recently, three undercover NYPD officers approached Patrick Dorismond, a Hai-
tian-American man, and asked if they could purchase drugs from him. See id. A scuffle
ensued after Dorismond rebuffed their request, and the officers fatally shot him. See id.
54. "Most black professionals can recount at least one incident of being stopped,
roughed up, questioned, or degraded by white police officers." Gaynes, supra note 33, at
625. Charles Ogletree, a distinguished African American Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School, has stated, "[ijf I am dressed in a knit cap and hooded jacket, I'm probable cause."
Ellen Goodman, Simpson Case Divides Us by Race, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1994, at 73.
55. See id. Joyner described his ordeals to a national audience in an interview aired on
the television show 20/20. The show subsequently sent out two groups of young men--
one African American group and one White group--to drive the same routes at the same
time of night on multiple evenings. The White group drove past the police 16 times
without once being stopped; the African American group was questioned by the police
"on several occasions." Id.
56. Morgan was assaulted by police officers in Los Angeles who thought he was an
accomplice of an African American drug smuggler. See Morgan v. Woessner, 975 F.2d
629, 633, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1992). Allen and Wilkes were both "ordered out of their cars
[by police officers] and treated like felons when there was no apparent reason to stop
them." Mydans, supra note 37, at B7.
57. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677 (1994); MANN, supra note 38, at 133. For
example, in Maryland, where 93.3% of the drivers on 1-95 violate traffic laws that could
warrant a stop by the State Police, 17.5% of the violators are African American and 74.7%
are White. See Macin, supra note 1, at 350. However, between January 1995 and Sep-
tember 1996, 80.3% of the motorists actually stopped by the State Police were people of
color. See id. at 350, 357 (adding that there is no evidence that African Americans drive
any differently from Whites). People of color in New Jersey face similar hazards on the
highways. A 1992 study reported that of the arrests on one stretch of the New Jersey
Turnpike, 80% were of African American males driving late-model cars with out-of-state
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and may face brutality comparable to that inflicted upon Rodney King,
Arthur McDuffie, Malice Green, and thousands of others who have been
killed or permanently injured and emotionally scarred by repugnant po-
lice thuggery solely because of the color of their skin. The
aforementioned stories-as well as similar ones told by friends and family
members-get "etched deep in the collective consciousness of American
blacks."' 8 They breed anger, resentment, alienation, and fear. 9
It is not hard, therefore, to understand why some people of color-
whether innocent or guilty of any wrongdoing--run at the sight of the
police. Seeing a police officer-let alone eight, as did Wardlow-often
means trouble for people of color, regardless of the legality of their pres-
ent activity. They do not know why the officer is in the area, and they
do not want to find out. They cannot accurately guess what will provoke
the officer (looking away or looking at him; walking away or standing
still), and they are better off not finding out. They do not want to be-
come another statistic. The Wardlow Court, therefore, was naive when it
concluded that flight is "certainly suggestive of [wrongdoing]."' 6 It ig-
nored the aforementioned well-grounded fears, which were clearly
brought to its attention by amicus curiae.61
license plates, even though such drivers accounted for only 4.7% of the total volume on
that stretch. See MANN, supra note 38, at 145.
Similarly, in Denver, Colorado, nearly half of the area's population of color had
"recent, significant contacts" with law enforcement agents. Id. at 144. One-third of the
police force did not equivocate when asked the cause of this disproportionate contact: the
overwhelming sentiment among Denver police officers was that "Blacks and Hispanics
required stricter law enforcement procedures than the rest of the population." Id.
58. MANN, supra note 38, at 160-61.
59. See, e.g., DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE PO-
LICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 109, 112 (1969) (describing people of color, as a result
of police-community relations, as "alienated, distrustfill, and belligerent with respect to
the police" and as "pervasively disenchanted" with the police).
60. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.
61. The NAACP LDF wrote in its amicus brief that "the circumstances under which
a citizen will run from the police are . . . numerous . . . and often based in innocence."
Brief for the NAACP LDF as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent 9, Wardlow, 120 S.
Ct. 673 (2000). It described flight from police officers by "inner-city minority residents-
the law-abiding no less than the criminal" as a "sincere and understandable response." Id.
The Court's ignorance was not lost on the four justices who dissented in part:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high-
crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely
innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with
the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associ-
ated with the officer's sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked
flight is neither 'aberrant' nor 'abnormal.'
Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"Headlong flight," as the Wardlow Court unsympathetically charac-
terized it,62 is rather a "prudent lesson of survival on the streets. 6 3 Given
the obvious pattern and practice of police brutality, it is understandable
that some people of color take precautions to evade the police. As shown
by countless examples, their physical and emotional well-being depend
on it. But the Court was blind to their fear and suffering. While a "color-
blind" decision is nice in theory, it is unworkable in practice. So long as
the LAPD's Rampart division, the NYPD Street Crimes Unit, and police
departments throughout the country continue tormenting communities
of color, we must remember that "[in order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race. There is no other way. ' ' 4
The Court cannot in good conscience turn an apathetic eye to this
reality and proclaim that flight-a reasonable precaution-combined only
with presence in a "high-crime area," is sufficient to subject an individual
to a humiliating Terry stop and the possibility of police abuse and harass-
65
ment. While it is arguable whether flight should be a factor at all, it
cannot be weighed so heavily that when linked only with another dubi-
ous cause (i.e., presence in a high-crime area),6 officers have established
an "articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.
67
B. Open Season in Poor, Minority Communities
Also weighed far too heavily by the Court was Wardlow's presence
in a "high-crime area. '" The Court condoned rather than condemned
62. Id. at 676.
63. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 153.
64. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
65. The Court's ignoring the legitimate fears of people of color is double-edged. As
stated, it overlooks decades of police officers' race-based harassment and brutality; it also
institutionalizes these fears, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of mistrust between people
of color and law enforcement. See generally Harris, supra note 57, at 660, 681. As we have
seen, people run because of a fear of the police. Wardlow, however, provides the police a
legally sufficient justification to chase down and conduct a pat-down search of such peo-
ple not otherwise engaged in suspicious activity, serving only to evoke further anger and
fear of the police on the part of people of color.
66. See infra Part II.B.
67. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
68. Wardlow-type overreliance on location is precisely the concern of Professor
Margaret Raymond. See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Con-
sidering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIo ST. L.J.
99 (1999) (arguing that a neighborhood's characteristics should be relevant under Terry
only when the observed behavior differs from that which is common among law-abiding
people at the time and place observed). She claims that "prosecutors and police rely on
the character of the neighborhood when they have little else," id. at 141, and therefore,
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the police practice of subjecting inner city residents to more intrusive
searches and seizures than affluent individuals.69 In addition, as with its
overemphasis on flight, the Court did not consider the disparate impact
an elevated reliance on location has on poor people of color. If we rec-
ognize that indigent minorities in "high-crime areas" will be
disproportionately burdened by more lenient location-based Terry stop
standards, we must realize that Wardlow, in effect, erodes Fourth
Amendment protections for this group while leaving such protections for
wealthier White people undisturbed.
"High-crime areas" are generally populated by people of a low so-
cioeconomic status and people of color. 70 With the previous discussion in
mind, it is not surprising that "high-crime area" residents are dispropor-
tionately the victims of police harassment and brutality.7' Police officers
engage in selective enforcement of the law-"going after" people in
the character of the neighborhood "come[s] to dominate the reasonable suspicion in-
quiry." Id. at 99.
Professor Maclin is equally skeptical about police officers grasping at straws to bol-
ster the reasonableness of their Terry stops. See Maclin, supra note 1. She points out the
enormous discretion police are afforded by their departments and the deference given to
them by courts, both of which lead to abuses of power. See id. Furthermore, knowing
that relying solely on the race of the suspect or his location in a "high-crime area" is in-
sufficient, officers frequently commit perjury to support Terry stops. See id. at 379-86
("Police often commit perjury... to effectuate arbitrary seizures ... to deny black[s] and
Hispanic[s] ... their substantive rights under the Fourth Amendment.").
69. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
70. See Raymond, supra note 68, at 137-38.
The "high-crime areas" and "areas associated with high levels of drug
activity" ... are not, by any means, evenly distributed across urban areas.
On the contrary, zones of high crime activity are concentrated in inner
city neighborhoods. In fact, the terms "inner city neighborhood" and
"high crime area" are synonymous for many Americans, including many
of the regular participants in the criminal justice process. These neigh-
borhoods tend to be poorer, older, and less able to support jobs and
infrastructure than either city neighborhoods more distant from the urban
core or suburban locations.
Harris, supra note 57, at 677. See also Albert J. Reiss, Jr., How Serious is Serious Crime?, 35
VAND. L. Rlv. 541, 572 (1982) ("Residents of high-crime areas share certain characteris-
tics of socioeconomic status, race, and age composition; they are likely to be black, low in
socioeconomic status, and relatively young in age.") (citing John Daldwin, Ecological &
Area Studies in Great Britain and the United States, in I CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL
REviaw, 47-48 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds., 1979)). These race- and class-based demo-
graphics have been prevalent in American (and European) cities for more than 150 years.
See id. at 572.
71. See COLE, supra note 33, ch. 1.
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high-crime areas more than in affluent suburbs. 72 "Punitive differential
enforcement" is clearly aimed at poor people of color.73 Unquestionably,
high-crime area residents and low-socioeconomic status suspects "receive
harsher treatment from the police" than wealthy people in middle- and
upper-class neighborhoods. 4 As Professor David Cole points out, resi-
dents of high-crime areas suffer from unequal and iniquitous police
practices.5
The most disturbing and least logical response to this location-based
injustice would be to make it even easier for the police to further dis-
criminate against poor people of color. However, Wardlow's heavy
emphasis on presence in a "high-crime area" produces precisely this re-
sult. Being a poor person of color already subjected one to
disproportionate police harassment and brutality before Wardlow; now the
Court has branded many poor people of color with a second strike for
purposes of Fourth Amendment protections.
The Court has sanctioned what has been a deplorable, yet
traditional, practice: every person in a high-crime neighborhood is "stop-
eligible., 76 Police were unofficially, yet unabashedly, relying on presence
in a high-crime neighborhood, without much else, to satisfy Terry's
reasonable suspicion standard before Wardlow.7 7 Now the Supreme Court
explicitly says that they need not articulate much more.
Just as people of color should not be stripped of their Fourth
Amendment rights, neither should people with a low socioeconomic
status. Regardless of whether residents of high-crime areas are more likely
to be the victims or perpetrators of crime,78 they deserve the same Fourth
72. See Douglas A. Smith, Christy A. Visher, & Laura A. Davidson, Equity and Dis-
cretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 234, 249 (1984). Professor Mann agrees: after studying records of arrests in
a range of neighborhoods, Mann concludes that "poverty level of a community was influ-
ential in such decisions." MANN, supra note 38, at 145.
73. Smith, Visher, & Davidson, supra note 72, at 249.
74. MANN, supra note 38, at 147. It thus comes as no surprise that people with in-
comes above $50,000 have much more favorable opinions of the police than people with
incomes under $7,500. Similarly, when asked to rank police officers' use of force, only
17% of indigent people thought of the police as "excellent," while the percentage of
wealthy people responding similarly was nearly double. COLE, supra note 33, at 171.
75. See David Cole, Race, Policing, and the Future of the Criminal Law, 26 HUM. RTS.
2, 4 (Summer 1999).
76. Raymond, supra note 68, at 99.
77. See id. at 128. Professor Raymond explains: "the character of the neighborhood
for criminality may bootstrap the [police officers'] observations to reasonable suspi-
cion .... [It] fail[s] to narrow the stop-eligible class in any meaningful way." Id.
78. The higher probability of being a criminal or a victim of criminal activity in a
high-crime area is often used to justify the authorization of more intrusive policing in
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Amendment protections extended to wealthier individuals. People in
downtrodden communities, contrary to the Supreme Court's intimations,
do have privacy interests. Moreover, they have homes and other property
interests at stake. Importantly-though this seems to have gotten lost
somewhere along the way-they have expectations of privacy in their
homes and over their bodies and property equal to those of wealthy citi-
zens.
While the plight of the urban poor is great, and the need for law
enforcement officials to protect themselves is vital, we cannot strip poor
people of color of their Fourth Amendment rights to solve these prob-
lems, lest we forget that the Fourth Amendment is an individual right.79
Allowing lesser Terry standards in high-crime neighborhoods does not
adequately balance fighting crime, protecting the police, and upholding
fundamental individual Fourth Amendment rights. It tells indigent citi-
zens that their rights are less important than the rights of those in
wealthier environments. The Court's ruling significantly withers Terry
protections for certain segments of the population, officially endorsing the
abuse to which poor people of color have been subjected unofficially for
years.
CONCLUSION
Indifferent to issues of race and class, the Wardlow Court watered
down Fourth Amendment protections for groups of people based on
their skin color and socioeconomic status. This will hurt already-strained
relations between poor communities of color and law enforcement
agencies, and it will subject members of such communities to further
police brutality and harassment.
We still live in a time where there are two worlds of criminal
justice: one for the privileged and one for the less privileged. Race and
class, as we have seen, unfortunately play a determining role in that
placement. If the Court is unwilling to take affirmative steps to break
down American pigmentocracy and aristocracy, it at least should not
proactively further the iniquity by granting poor people of color fewer
protections than affluent members of the majority. Though it cloaks its
rhetoric in equality and fairness, the Court has ensured through its
such communities. See COLE, supra note 33, at 44-47 (referring to such a policy as
"quality of life policing").
79. See Colb, supra note 28, at 1457. "Recently, however, it seems the Rehnquist
Court is more concerned about the needs and interests of police officers, than the rights
of individuals.... As Professor Yale Kamisar asks ... '[w]hose [a]mendment [i]s [i]t
[alnyway?'" Macin, supra note 8, at 275.
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decision in Wardlow that the "administration of criminal law ... is in fact
predicated on [the] exploitation of inequality. ' ' 0
The twin adversities of race and place work incredible hardships on
indigent people of color, even without the Court sanctioning pervasive
police and societal discrimination. With its official imprimatur, the Court
has furthered the divide between the two worlds of criminal justice.
80. CoLE, supra note 33, at 5.
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